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THE LEGAL PERSONA: AN ESSAY ON THE PROFESSIONAL
MASK
James R. Elkins*
T HE legal profession offers little opportunity for the practi-
tioner to analyze the fundamental constructs underlying the
legal system or the dynamics of the lawyering process. Jurispru-
dence and legal education traditionally have emphasized the exter-
nal aspects of law, implying that man is a rational decisionmaker
who freely controls his life and shapes societal institutions., This
approach is unrealistic because it neglects the psychological dimen-
sion of man and the complexity of man's behavior.2 Jurisprudential
scholars and legal educators should recognize that a growing body
of sophisticated literature in linguistics and anthropology as well as
social psychology and psychiatry is also relevant to the study of
* Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University, College of Law; A.B., University
of Kentucky, 1967; J.D., University of Kentucky, 1971; LL.M., Yale University, 1975.
This essay would not have been written but for the innovative and creative work of my
friend, teacher, and counselor, John Batt. This piece is at best a frail reflection of his enig-
matic, Dionysian, and Protean spirit.
Anglo-American jurisprudence traditionally has rested on a liberal social ideology that
assumes both individual free will and a clear division between thought and deed.
Historically it has been one of the tasks of liberalism to defend the distinction between
a man's mind and his actions, his intentions and his deeds; otherwise there seemed a
danger of the individual not being able to defend himself against state action. Hence
the well-known maxim from English law that "the thought of man is not tryable; the
Devil alone knows the thought of man." To judge the soul of a man, instead of his
actions, seemed to open the way to tyranny.... This characteristic attitude can be
traced throughout liberal legal theory. It was one reason for Justice Holmes's insistence
on external standards in criminal liability, since morals concern the "actual internal
state of the individual's mind, what he actually intends."
P. ROAZEN, FESuD: POUTICAL AND SOCIAL THOUGHT 58 (1st ed. 1968) (footnote omitted).
I One voice rebelling against jurisprudential thinkers who do not understand the psycho-
logical dimensions of man is Professor John Batt. He has described jurisprudence as the
"unsexed servant of repression" and condemned the contemporary philosopher of law for his
obsession "with order, rationality, logic, and predictability." Batt, They Shoot Horses, Don't
They?: An Essay on the Scotoma of One-Eyed Kings, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 510, 548 (1968).
See also E. ROBINSON, LAW AND THE LAWYERS 73 (1935); Batt, Notes from the Penal Colony:
A Jurisprudence Beyond Good and Evil, 50 IowA L. Rv. 999 (1965). Batt rallies the cry
against:
Jurisprudes [who] calk up the fissures in their logical castles of absurdity, rumble
about nonideological principles of law, acro-arc through logico-linguistic feats of ver-
bomania, distinguish "is" from "ought," lust after the "pure law," or dispense sweet
allegories about the Light of the Law that failed the Virgin Lady of the Lake[.]
Id. at 999-1000 (footnote omitted).
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the lawyer in society. This essay adopts a socio-psychological frame
of reference and explores the images and guises of the lawyer as a
professional in an attempt to add a new perspective to contempo-
rary philosophy of lawyering.
I.
Positing a "legal persona,"8 as the title of this essay suggests,
presumes that lawyers possess certain characteristics that set them
apart as a group.4 Whether lawyers in fact have a special identity
depends on the answer to two questions. First, do lawyers present
themselves to the world in a way that calls attention to themselves
as lawyers?5 Second, do lawyers perceive themselves as different
from other professionals? Arguably, lawyers represent themselves to
the world and are perceived by the world through images. That is,
in the "presentation of self in everyday life,"6 the self is not shown
but only a reflection or image of the self. For the individual lawyer,
this image is a mask of the true self-a persona-which defines his
professional identity for himself and for society. In addition, owing
to his professional training, the lawyer conceives of himself as "a
"Persona" was the name given to the mask worn by an actor in Greek drama to signify
the role that he played. G. ALLPORT, PERSONALITY: A PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRErATION 25 (1937).
The legal persona described in this essay is a kind of profile or social character, not an
empirical construct. It is based on the author's exposure to lawyers, judges, law teachers, and
law students.
This article will not attempt to explore the problem of what it is to act like a lawyer except
to note that it involves a sense of restraint in action. One commentator finds the "skill of
restraint... rooted in the tradition of law." Christenson, Studying Law As the Possibility of
Principled Action, 50 DEN. L.J. 413, 432 (1974). As a personal style, restraint may be a factor
in becoming a successful law student. See Kennedy, How the Law School Fails: A Polemic,
1 YALE REV. L. & Soc. Act. 71, 77 (1970).
The initial presumption of this essay of a single legal "persona" simplifies reality. Law-
yers play such diverse roles that placing all lawyers together for purposes of any characteriza-
tion is problematic. For example, law-trained sociologist David Reisman has noted that "the
law-trained person is likely to be found almost anywhere in the American social structure."
Reisman, Law and Sociology: Recruitment, Training and Colleagueship, 9 STAN. L. REV. 643,
645 (1957). The multiplicity of lawyering roles strains yet need not destroy the validity of the
presumption that there exists a general legal persona, which may be the subject of inquiry.
5 Sociologist Erving Goffman has commented that:
Whatever an individual does and however he appears, he knowingly and unknow-
ingly makes information available concerning the attributes that might be imputed to
him and hence the categories in which he might be placed. The status symbolism in
his "personal front" provides information about his group and aggregate affiliations;
his treatment at the hands of others conveys a conception of him; the physical milieu
itself conveys implications concerning the identity of those who are in it.
E. GOFFMAN, ENCOUNTERS 102 (1961).
' E. GoFmA.N, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959).
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special kind of person both different from and somewhat better than
those nonprofessional members of the social order."7 The lawyer's
perception of himself as a lawyer and his perception of his role in
society begin to crystallize during his first days in law school. Con-
fronted with the Socratic method of teaching that obliges him to
master a new form of reasoning, the law student begins to adjust his
view of the world to accord with his changed environment. And
through the persuasive efforts of law professors and older law stu-
dents, the prospective lawyer realizes that he must learn to "talk
like a lawyer" and to "think like a lawyer" to become a lawyer.
A. Talking Like a Lawyer
From the public's perspective, lawyers speak an arcane language,
commonly termed "legalese." In a vehement attack on legalese,
written almost forty years ago, Fred Rodell' argued that while a
lawyer deals with ordinary facts and occurrences of business, gov-
ernment, and living, he nevertheless uses "a jargon which com-
pletely baffles and befoozles the ordinary literate man.... ." Rodell
berated lawyers for their use of "professional pig Latin" and their
failure to relate legal concepts to clients in simple English.'0
[Tihe lawyers' trade is a trade built entirely on words. And so long
as the lawyers carefully keep to themselves the key to what those
words mean, the only way the average man can find out what is
going on is to become a lawyer, or at least to study law, himself. All
of which makes it very nice-and very secure-for the lawyers.1
Whatever the justice of Rodell's indictment, his analysis high-
lights the way a lawyer's language sets him apart from the general
population. Although the bare use of jargon, of course, does not
distinguish the lawyer from other professionals, the centrality of
interpreting and manipulating language to resolve most legal prob-
lems makes verbal dexterity essential for successful lawyering.2 The
legal persona finds its voice in the technical language of the law,
through such terms as mens rea, due process, void ab initio, and
inter vivos trust. Even in the use of standard English, the lawyer
Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUMAN RIGHts 1, 18 (1975).
'F. RODELL, WOE UNTO You, LAWYMS! (1939).
' Id. at 7.
Id. at 8-9.
" Id. at 9.
12 See W. PROBERT, LAW, LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION 7 (1972); J. STONE, LAW AND THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES IN THE SECOND HALF CENTURY 57 (1966).
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sometimes uses the layman's meaning and at other times gives the
words special legal meaning.13 The lawyer's ability to shift meanings
of words reinforces the need for both a common and special vocabu-
lary and emphasizes the importance of precision in the use of tech-
nical terms. Thus, learning and mastering the subtleties of legal
language are an integral part of the socialization and professional-
ization of the lawyer.'
B. Thinking Like a Lawyer
Theorizing that lawyers have a unique way of thinking suggests
that they have a singular view of the world that shapes their interac-
tion with clients and their approach to problem solving. Social sci-
entists believe:
Each of us creates a representation of the world in which we
live-that is, we create a map or model which we use to generate
our behavior. Our representation of the world determines to a large
degree what our experience of the world will be, how we will perceive
the world, what choices we will see available to us as we live in the
world. 5
Thus our world view 6 (or Weltanschauung) controls not only the
11 For example, reasonable man, substantial evidence, proximate cause, negligence, com-
plaint, and self-defense are all reasonably intelligible words but have both their plain and
special meaning to the lawyer. The lawyer must be aware of both these meanings and perceive
whether they are being used in their special or their ordinary sense. Probert & Brown,
Theories and Practices in the Legal Profession, 19 U. FLA. L. REv. 447, 470-71 (1966-1967).
See also J. STONE, supra note 12, at 62.
" See Probert, Law Through the Looking Glass of Language and Communicative Behavior,
20 J. LEGAL EDuc. 253 (1968):
A lawyer's professionalization seems to include learning "to talk like a lawyer," not
by learning just rules but also special concepts and doctrines with definitional and
logical interrelationships, adding up to a syntax of a unique kind. Even though law
school materials emphasize common law, still, these verbalisms seem to be tran-
scended by a lawyer approach with language that finds its way into wills, contracts,
and various instruments as well as into a lawyer's thinking, talking, and writing in a
way that heavily influences how he acts.
Id. (footnote omitted).
See generally W. Bismsi & C. STONE, LAw, LANGUAGE, AND ETmIcs 403-15 (1972); J. FRANK,
COURTS ON TIAL 171-76 (1949); I. MEHLER, EE'rmv LEGAL COMMUNICATION 3-20 (1975); D.
MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 201-82 (1963); Allen, The Dynamics of Interpersonal
Communication and the Law, 3 WASHBURN L.J. 135, 138-43 (1964); Eisele, The Legal Imagi-
nation and Language: A Philosophical Criticism, 47 U. COLO. L. Rav. 363 (1976); Rutter, A
Jurisprudence of Lawyers' Operations, 13 J. LEGAL Enuc. 301, 318-24 (1961).
Is 1 R. BANDLER & J. GRINDER, THE STRUCTURE OF MAGIC 7 (1975). See R. REDFIELD, THE
PmmTIvE WORLD AND ITS TRANSFORMATIONS 85-87 (1953).
", The concept of world view has been described from various perspectives. Several differ-
ent disciplines use terms closely related to the concept of world view as used here: "conceptual
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way we represent the world to ourselves but also the way we experi-
ence the world.'"
What attributes of lawyers and lawyering create a special "world
view"?' Simply stated, the lawyer considers himself a neutral,'
rational,0 and objective problem solver.2' As a rational thinker, the
lawyer perceives client problems, clients, and self through the mist
of legal rules and legal problems. In essence, a lawyer's way of think-
ing and representing certain events in the world consists of a dislike
of vague generalities, the structuring of all possible human relations
into the form of claims and counterclaims, and the belief that
systems," Harvey, Conceptual Systems and Attitude Change, in ATITUDE, EGO-
INVOLVEMENT, AND CHANGE 201, 201-06 (C. Sherif & M. Sherif eds. 1967); "cognitive style,"
Nisbett & Temoshok, Is There an "External" Cognitive Style?, 33 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCH.
36, 36 (1976); "belief system," Converse, The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics, in
IDEOLOGY AND DiscoNTNmar 206, 206-07 (D. Apter ed. 1964); "ideology," IDEOLOGY AND Dis-
CONTENT (D. Apter ed. 1964); "cosmology," M. DOUGLAS, NATURAL SYMBOLS 144 (1973).
On the significance of the concept of world view in anthropology, see G. FosTmE, TZIN-
TzNAN MEXUcAN PEASANTS IN A CHANGING WORLD 11-12 (1967); E. HoEBEL, MAN IN THE
PRMrTIVE WORLD 158-59 (2d ed. 1958).
"7 See E. ERIKSON, Toys AND REASON 141 (1977).
Erikson describes world view as "an all-inclusive conception which, when it is historically
viable, integrates a group's imagery." Accordingly, "it focuses disciplined attention on a
selection of verifiable facts; it liberates a joint vision which enhances a sense of historical
reality; and it actualizes a widening fellowship with strong work commitments." E. ERIKSON,
supra at 148.
11 "That lawyers have particularly pronounced intellectual habits peculiar to them has
often been noticed, especially by historians and other students of society . . . ." J. SHKLAR,
LEGAUSM 9 (1964). See also M. BARKUN, LAW WrrHouT SANCTIONS 77 (1968).
11 One of the most prevalent myths in the legal system is the myth of neutrality, symbolized
by blindfolded justice. One manifestation of this myth is the persistent dream that the
judicial process is neutral. See, e.g., Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1959). Professors Arthur Miller and Ronald Howell, however,
drawing upon the leading commentators in philosophy, sociology, history, science, and theol-
ogy have concluded that neutrality and objectivity in decisionmaking are not attainable. Law
and the decisional process by which it is invoked and applied are not value-free. "[V]alue
preferences inescapably intrude to guide decisions made among competing alternatives." See
Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. REv.
661, 665 (1960).
2 The myth of rationality in the legal profession is founded on a model of human behavior
seriously at odds with modem psychology. Like classical economic theory, it views man as
totally rational and influenced in his decisionmaking only by external objective factors.
Lawyering is in some part, however, defined by the individual's unconscious and the collec-
tive consciousness of the legal profession. Lawyers and jurisprudential scholars have lost
sight of the dynamic reciprocity between the conscious and the unconscious modes of thought.
See generally T. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 16-19 (1963).
11 "Legal thinking, like all purposive thinking, is directed toward the solution of problems.
Clients and courts ask questions. The lawyer must find answers." C. MORRIS, How LAWYERS
THINK 3 (1938).
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human conflicts can be settled under established rules in a judicial
proceeding."
Judith Shklar has labeled this professional view of the world
"legalism." She defines it as "the ethical attitude that holds moral
conduct to be a matter of rule following, and moral relationships to
consist of duties and rights determined by rules."' In the final
sense, legalism is "a way of thinking about social life, a mode of
consciousness" that structures the lawyer's social experience24 and
prescribes a code of conduct for individual lawyers.2s
Legalism also creates and molds the lawyer's legal persona.6
"The legal view is no more narrowing than any other unidimen-
sional explanation of the world; yet it is "more deluding than some
other world views" in "its covert character."-" Law professors and
lawyers erroneously believe that their legal training and their intel-
22 J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 10 (1976). See also S. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS
153 (1974).
2 J. SHKLAR, supra note 18, at 1. Judith Shklar's work on legalism indicts the effort to
separate law and morality. For a criticism of lawyer attitudes in the lawyer-client relation-
ship, see Wasserstrom, supra note 7, at 1. See also Chroust, Law: Reason, Legalism, and the
Judicial Process, 74 ETIcs 1 (1963); Friedman, On Legalistic Reasoning-A Footnote to
Weber, 1966 WIS. L. REv. 148. For an exploration of the effect of "legalism" on the attorney-
client relationship and counseling alternatives, see, for example, A. WATSON, THE LAWYER IN
THE INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELUNG PROCESS (1976); Elkins, A Counseling Model for Lawyer-
ing in Divorce Cases, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 229, 229-33 (1977).
24 R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLmcs 75 (1975). One commentator has suggested that an
ideological view premised on legalism "is as much an obscuring veil as a clarifying lens for
approaching social problems. Law and legal thinking are as frequently the cause of social
trouble as the means of resolving it." D'Errico, "The Law Is Terror Put into Words," 2
LEARNING & L. 1, Fall 1975, at 39, 40.
Jerold Auerbach has also indicted the legal profession for its failure to promote social
justice in this country. Auerbach contends that this failure is due, in part, to legal minds
"hemmed in by the ingrained professional preference for process and order, moderation and
compromise." J. AUERBACH, supra note 22, at 266.
5 See J. SHKLAR, supra note 18, at 1, 5, 8.
2 An interesting example of the internalization of legal concepts is the legal profession's
recurrent attempt to achieve certainty in the law. The result of these attempts has been
"system construction, the attempt to account for all occurrences within an all-encompassing
framework of laws and principles and to deny to the individual any role in shaping events."
W. VOLKOMER, THE PASSIONATE LmBERAL: THE PoLrmCAL AND LEGAL IDEAS OF JEROME FRANK 25
(1970) (footnote omitted). Jerome Frank has suggested that this desire to achieve certainty
reflects an unconscious wish to find in law a substitute for the firmness, certainty, and
infallibility ascribed in childhood to the parent. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MovDERN MIND 3-21
(1930). See Bienenfeld, Prolegomena to a Psychoanalysis of Law and Justice, (pt. 1) 53 CALIF.
L. REv. 957, 989-99 (1965). See also J. FL GEL, MAN, MORALS AND SocIETY 52-58 (1945); A.
KARDINER, THE INDIVIDUAL AND His SocIETY 32 (1939); Redmount, Psychological Views in
Jurisprudential Theories, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 472, 504-05 (1959); Schoenfeld, The Superego's
Influence on the Law, 14 DE PAUL L. REV. 299, 307-08 (1965).
" S. SCHEINGOLD, supra note 22, at 160-61.
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lectual tools will enable them "to strip a problem, any problem,
down to its essentials."' The socialization process begun in law
school" creates and provides the lawyer with a new model of the
world-a world of rights and obligations, liabilities, and causes of
action-which excludes much from its vision. As Professor Schein-
gold has noted: "When we accuse someone of being legalistic, we
suggest an excessive zeal for purely formal details which becloud
rather than clarify the real issue. The legalist is someone who is lost
among the trees and cannot or will not consider the overall shape
of the forest."' The process of "thinking like a lawyer" thus pro-
vides no basis for critically analyzing and assessing the assumptions
underlying the lawyer's peculiar view of the world.3'
C. Relationship Between "Thinking" and "Talking" Like a
Lawyer-A Subjective View of the Legal Process
Although the use of legal language and thinking like a lawyer have
been explored thus far independently, these segments of the legal
persona are intertwined because the existence and structure of legal
language make it possible to think like a lawyer. 2 Legal language
Id. at 161.
It was the proudest boast of law schools to train students to think like lawyers. This
process entailed a highly stylized mode of intellectual activity that rewarded inductive
reasoning, analytical precision, and verbal felicity. But relentless doctrinal analysis of
appellate opinions severely restricted the range and depth of inquiry. Craft was re-
warded over choice and process over purpose. Thinking like a lawyer required the
application of technical skills to the task of problem-resolution within the confines of
the adversary system. Justice, it was assumed, emerged inevitably from the confronta-
tion of skilled advocates in an adversary setting. Legalism instilled "laissez-faire mo-
rality" in its converts: the presumption that proper decisions were the decisions that
the legal system produced.
J. AUERBACH, supra note 22, at 276 (footnote omitted).
" Both the legal profession and legal education promote and maintain legalism as a world
view. Scheingold argues that there is "a world view implicit in the paradigm that structures
legal education ... [e.g.,] the student is provided with an approach which seems to both
explain and justify the working of the American system." S. SCHmNOoI, supra note 22, at
158. See note 28 supra.
30 S. ScHEINooLD, supra note 22, at 153.
3, For a presentation of radical alternatives, see Bonsignore, At the Edge of Law, 11 Am.
Bus. L.J. 135 (1973); Savoy, Toward a New Politics in Legal Education, 79 YALE L.J. 444,
455-504 (1970).
2 For an illuminating discussion of the relationship between legal language and "thinking
like a lawyer," see J. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (1973). In considering how language
structures one's world, Professor White poses a series of thoughtful questions concerning the
role of language in the lawyering process. He asks whether the peculiarities that we observe
in the lawyer's use of and experience with language
reside in the existence of a discrete professional language, with its own vocabulary and
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is the medium through which the forms and categories of events can
be made meaningful within the legal system. The legal persona
communicates, analyzes and classifies problems, and structures re-
lationships based on these linguistic categories:
[A lawyer] mentally converts events and transactions into the vo-
cabulary and the pigeon holes of a classification system which per-
vades the whole corpus of the law. Thus a certain exchange of com-
munications between persons may be seen by the lawyer as an
"offer" and an "acceptance" forming a "contract."'.'. .If one of the
persons involved was a seventeen year old boy, the lawyer translates
this fact into "minor," and a cluster of concepts follows along with
it. Lawyers instinctively engage in this process of mental categoriza-
tion and classification. 3
A lawyer's world view acts as a perceptual screen for incoming
sensory data4.3 Language concepts screen and structure one's per-
ception and allow one to organize information and experiences.35
Through these concepts or "perceptual categories," one abstracts
and maps physical and social reality.36 At the most rudimentary
level of perception then, what the lawyer characterizes as "out
syntax? Or in habits of mind and ways of working that find expression in whatever
,verbal language the lawyer uses, even when he is talking, say, to his client or to a jury
in ordinary English? And most serious of all: what relationship can the lawyer establish
with these patterns of thought and language that he uses? Can he simply learn to use
and master them without being somewhat affected-perhaps controlled-by what he
has learned? To put the question in even larger terms: what is the relationship between
the lawyer's language and his mind?
Id. at5.
3 Meador, The Mind of the Lawyer, or Why Doctors Should Not Have Trouble with
Lawyers, 22 ALA. L. REv. 503, 505 (1970). See also C. MoRius, supra note 21, at 75-94.
31 S. GREER, THE LOGIC OF SociAL INQUIRY 30 (1969).
Since there is neither space for storing nor time for reviewing an indefinitely large
number of unique memories, somehow the organism must operate on a more schematic
basis. Out of the diversity and uncertainty the organism must be able to extract the
essence of an object .... Efficient perception therefore depends on objects and situa-
tions have recurrent properties; that is, properties that occur together with reason-
able frequency in the environment.
Kaplan, Cognitive Maps in Perception and Thought, in IMAGE AND ENVIRONMWENT 63, 67 (R.
Downs & D. Stea eds. 1973).
Is Linguist B.L. Whorf has argued forcibly that our language influences the manner in
which the individual or larger cultural group labels reality and behaves with respect to it.
His persuasive hypothesis is that different cultures perceive and conceive reality in different
ways and that the language spoken by members of a culture shapes the cognitive structure
of the individual speaking that language. Whorf, The Punctual and Segmentative Aspects of
Verbs in Hopi, in LANGUAGE, THOUGHT, AND REALITY 51, 55 (J. Carroll ed. 1956). See also J.
BRITrON, LANGUAGE AND LEARNING 11-32 (1970); C. MuELLa, THE PoLrrIcs OF COMMUNICATION
16 (1973).
31 See M. BARKUN, supra note 18, at 79.
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there" is not a true picture of an objective event or scene but a
personal and social assessment. 7
This subjectivity of factual data has significance for both the
postulates of the legal system and for practical lawyering. The legal
persona, with its particular world view, excludes a vast body of
information from its awareness.38 The legal persona is the mask
through which the lawyer sees the world and through which his
individual and collective experiences are viewed and filtered .3 In
this way, the lawyer maintains a coherent world view by selecting
facts and excluding those which are unacceptable.
The lawyer's subjective manipulation of facts is analogous to the
work of the historian. A lawyer typically obtains his facts from a
client and then reviews, selects, organizes, and synthesizes these
facts into a coherent and manageable form. Legal briefs, for exam-
ple, are little more than historical documents, recounting an event
and the temporarily prevailing rules that govern the event. 0 Law-
yers do not even attempt an objective history by selecting "true"
factual statements. The adversary nature of the legal system re-
quires the attorney to employ only those facts-with a judicious
reordering of unfavorable facts-that will advance the cause of his
client.'
37 Many social scientists maintain that facts are in part constructions of the intellect and
relative to the context in which they are formulated. See, e.g., S. GREER, supra note 34, at
32-33; Franck & Gold, The Limits of Perceptual Objectivity in International Peace
Observation, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 183 (1968) (reviewing theories of the subjective
nature of visual perception).
Philosopher Susanne Langer characterizes sensory data as "primarily symbols." S. LANGER,
PHILOSOPHY IN A NEW KEY 29 (2d ed. 1951). Reality in this view is socially constructed. Thus,
"the edifice of human knowledge stands before us, not as a vast collection of sense reports,
but as a structure of facts that are symbols and laws that are their meanings." Id.
m Scholars in the field of developmental psychology have commented on the exclusionary
features of a particular "world view":
Considerations of developmental psychology provide the basis for the possibility that
the organism has exercised a considerable selection over what features of the world it
gives the priority of its attention and the structuralization of its language. That the
view of the world thus obtained is relative, rather than absolute, and incorrect in
certain applications is held by many theoretical physicists.
Deikman, Bimodal Consciousness, in THE NATUR OF HUmAN CONSCIOUSNESS 67, 84 (R. Orn-
stein ed. 1973). See generally M. BARKuN, supra note 18, at 78.
31 See Rutter, A Jurisprudence of Lawyers' Operations, 13 J. LEGAL EDUC. 301, 319 (1961).
See generally J. FRANK, supra note 14.
" Law itself "is an incurably historical enterprise." J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE
LAW 152 (1976).
"1 See also I. BERLIN, HISTORICAL INvrTAmrr' 5-30 (1954).
The writing of history, like the drafting of legal briefs, involves the highlighting of a few,
1978]
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In addition to the adversary nature of the legal system that
reinforces partisanship and nonobjectivity, the method of analysis
that lawyers use necessarily is subjective. Generally, legal analysis
begins with the definition of the problem. Yet the very questions
asked necessarily restrict and dictate the theories used to solve the
problem.42 Although subjectivity inspires the questions posed for
resolution and shapes the "facts" upon which the legal process oper-
ates, the legal system assumes that "facts" mirror reality and pro-
vide an objective basis upon which to invoke the legal process.
One theory that both clarifies and partially explains this imposi-
tion of one's subjective view of the world onto the external world is
the psychoanalytic theory of projection. The creation of our external
world by way of projection is a complex phenomenon with a basis
in the operation of the ego43 and the superego44 of the individual
psyche. Projection is viewed as psychic energy directed outward,
effectuating the externalization of psychic content. Projection per-
forms a number of different functions, including acting as a defense
mechanism, but "it also comes into being where there are no con-
flicts. The projection of inner perceptions to the outside is a primi-
tive mechanism which, for instance, also influences our sense-
perceptions.., in shaping our outer world."45
selected events. Levi-Strauss dismisses the possibility of completely reconstructing historical
events:
What is true of the constitution of historical facts is no less so of their selection. From
this point of view, the historian and the agent of history choose, sever and carve them
up, for a truly total history would confront them with chaos.... In so far as history
aspires to meaning, it is doomed to select regions, periods, groups of men and individu-
als in these groups and to make them stand out, as discontinuous figures, against a
continuity barely good enough to be used as a backdrop .... What makes history
possible is that a sub-set of events is found, for a given period, to have approximately
the same significance for a contingent of individuals who have not necessarily experi-
enced the events and may even consider them at an interval of several centuries.
History is therefore never history, but history-for. It is partial in the sense of being
biased even when it claims not to be, for it inevitably remains partial-that is, incom-
plete-and this is itself a form of partiality.
Levi-Strauss, History and Dialectic, in ThE STRUCTruAusTS: FROM MARx TO Lzvi-SmAUss
209, 222-23 (R. DeGeorge & F. DeGeorge eds. 1972) (footnote omitted).
,See K. CARLSTON, LAW AND ORGANIZATION IN WORM SOCIETY at vi-vii (1962).
, Arguably, Freud's later formulations of the ego create a model of the ego as projector.
See Bergan & Rosenberg, The New Neo-Freudians: Psychoanalytic Dimensions of Social
Change, 34 PSYCH. 19, 29 (1971). "Objects in the environment are not really dealt with as
being integral or separate from the self, but, rather, derive their meaning as receptacles for
projected unconscious material." Id. at 31-32.
" For an analysis of the superego as a bridge to the social sciences, see T. PARSONS, SOCIAL
STucrua. AND PERSONALrrY 31 (1964); P. ROAZEN, supra note 1, at 190.
" S. FREUD, Totem and Taboo, in THE BASIC WRMNGS OF SIGMUND FREUD 805, 857 (1938).
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The significance of viewing law as a projection of mental processes
and structure immediately becomes apparent. " If law is constructed
through a projective mechanism, law is neither fixed in nature nor
external to man but is dependent upon the formation and evolution
of the psyche. 47 Edgar Bodenheimer has observed that "the law is
not a pure fact of physical or psychological reality which can be
explained fully by means of an analytic description of cause-effect
relations. It is, to a considerable extent, a purposeful creation of the
human mind."4 Law in this sense is not a "given" or a natural
condition that must be accepted. Rather, it is a projection first of
structure and second of unconscious needs.49
See generally Novick & Kelly, Projection and Externalization, in 25 THE PSYCHOANALYTIC
STUDY OF THE CHILD 69 (1970); van Lennep, The Four-Picture Test, in AN INTRODUCTION TO
PROJECTIVE TECHNIQUES 149, 153 (H. Anderson & G. Anderson eds. 1951).
By systematically obtaining and reviewing an individual's projections onto external
objects, therapists gain insight into that individual's psychic functioning. See Holt, The
Thematic Apperception Test, in AN INTRODUCTION TO PROJECTIVE TECHNIQUES 181, 211 (H.
Anderson & G. Anderson eds. 1951).
11 For a discussion on the introjection of legal constructs, see L. POSPISIL, ANTHROPOLOGY
OF LAW 197-209 (1971). See also D. EASTON & J. DENNIS, CHILDREN IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM:
ORIGINS OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY (1969); R. HESS & J. TORNEY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLrICAL
ATrrrUDES IN CHILDREN (1967); J. PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (1965).
10 A number of scholars have considered the "internal/external" dichotomy (internal forces
vs. external behavior) in law and psychology. See, e.g., Goldstein, Psychoanalysis and
Jurisprudence, 77 YALE L.J. 1053, 1054 (1968).
Legal techniques for resolving a social conflict concentrate on modifying the relation-
ship of the persons by using resources from social institutions, such as courts and legal
sanctions which impose external constraints on conduct. Psychiatry approaches con-
flict resolution by attempting to draw upon the patient's inner resources for strength-
ening his capacities to accommodate himself to the demands of the relationship and
external environment. Law, that is, does not try to change the person but tries to
modify the environment in ways that will better meet the person's needs. Psychiatry
tends to accept the environment as it is and tries to alter the person, his feelings,
attitudes, and expectations, so that he may adjust to the demands of the environment
with less conflict.
Baernstein, Functional Relations Between Law and Psychiatry-A Study of Characteristics
Inherent in Professional Interaction, 23 J. LEGAL EDUC. 399, 417 (1971).
"E. BODENHEIMER, PowER, LAW, AND SOCIETY 3 (1973).
4' A number of contemporary theorists have moved beyond psychoanalytic theory to exam-
ine the innate structures that influence both the unconscious mind and cognitive processes.
Professor Donald Hermann, for example, has recently proposed a structural approach to legal
reasoning that urges the viability of looking beyond the personal unconscious for new perspec-
tives on jurisprudence. Hermann theorizes:
A structural approach provides a system wherein the data supplied by factual disputes
and their resolution can be organized and characterized, thereby forming a body of
general rules and precedents that constitutes a coherent legal system. The articulation
of a system of rules and decisions, in turn, can be seen as both the result of structuring
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II.
To this point only those aspects of the legal persona created by
projection of internal forces outward have been discussed. But the
legal mask is more than a product of the individual lawyer's orienta-
tion in the world: it encompasses a social ideal of the legal mind and
legal character that time, period, and culture create and transform.
The legal mask is not only a "cover-up" of the self by the self but a
result of the self in unconscious conspiracy with society. Social ex-
pectations call it forth; social pressures reinforce and preserve it.
A. Roles and the Legal Persona
A deeper insight into the nature of the legal persona can be at-
tained by studying the social roles lawyers play." A "role" is a
pattern for conduct in a particular social position: role behavior is
derived from the demands and expectations of those who interact
with an individual in a particular setting." A role constitutes in sum
an "organized system of participation of an individual in a social
system, with special reference to the organization of that social
system as a collectivity. '5 2
Through membership in a profession, the individual acquires a
sense of "identity to the role and solidarity" with other members.53
activity and, through its development and use in decisionmaking, a part of the struc-
turing activity itself.
Hermann, A Structuralist Approach to Legal Reasoning, 48 S. CAL.L. Rxv. 1131, 1133 (1975)
(footnotes omitted).
" See Elkins, Book Review, 30 VAND. L. Rav. 923, 928-29 (1977). For a description of a first-
year course in law school that explores lawyers' roles and personal relations, see Greenebaum
& Parsloe, Roles and Relations in Legal Practice, 28 J. LEGAL EDUC. 228 (1976).
S1 See Wallace, An Excursion into the Affinities Between Law and the Behavioral Sciences,
18 J. LEGAL EDUC. 43, 48 (1965); Watson, The Quest for Professional Competence: Psychologi-
cal Aspects of Legal Education, 37 U. CiN. L. REv. 93, 105 (1968). The lawyer's fascination
with rules also molds the lawyer's role.
A role can be viewed as a master rule which reconciles and directs the actions of those
who take it .... [A] typical role very often consists of many specific rules which the
role-player will have to follow. It can be said, therefore, that a major function of roles
is to help us decide, when in doubt, just what rules are applicable to situations with
which we must deal.
W. BISHIN & C. STONE, supra note 14, at 807.
52 Parsons, Definitions of Health and Illness in the Light of American Values and Social
Structure, in PATIENTS, PHY sI IANS, AND ILLNESS 97, 99 (E. Jaco ed. 1972).
1 Apter, Ideology and Discontent, in IDEOLOGY AND DISCON'TE 15, 42 (D. Apter ed. 1964).
For a psychological perspective, see A. WATSON, PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS 11-14 (1968). For
commentaries on the sociology of professionalism, see generally E. HUGHES, MEN AND THEIR
WORK (1958); W. MOORE & G. ROSENBLum, THE PROFESSIONS-ROLES AND RuLES (1970); T.
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Attributes and values of the profession mold and structure the law-
yer's role. The collection of individuals, in this case lawyers, with
similar masks, creates something greater than the sum of the indi-
viduals organized: the profession attains an integrity and status as
a community within a community. 4 And it is through the profes-
sional mask (which signals to clients that the lawyer has the requi-
site knowledge and skills) that the lawyer is able to play his role. 5
There is a dimension to each individual lawyer that cannot be
defined by societal expectations which roughly define the legal role.
To locate the individual within the legal role, one must look beyond
the "fit" of the mask; one must move inside. Within, one encounters
the individual's self-identity-the psychological orientation to
role.5" One may find that the lawyer identifies with his social role
as lawyer or perhaps that he has simply adopted a temporary orien-
tation in the world, playing out the legal persona for a fee.
The lawyer plays other roles of obvious importance outside the
legal fraternity-in his private activities and in his relationships
with family, friends, and neighbors. 5 Here one must consider
"[t]he lawyer's sense of himself as a person [which] is broader and
deeper than his sense of himself as a lawyer."" Both private roles
and identity, and the values associated with the self constantly
shape and define the lawyer's professional life consciously and un-
consciously. Unconsciously, the individual may be motivated to se-
lect a profession in which certain kinds of relationships are likely
and where certain personal needs (e.g., power, self-esteem, control)
are met.5" Andrew Watson has suggested that people choose law as
PARSONS, The Professions and Social Structure, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 34 (rev.
ed. 1954); M. WEBER, ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 198-223 (1954); F. ZNANICKI, THE
SOCIAL ROLE OF THE MAN OF KNOWLEDGE (1940).
" See Wallace, supra note 51, at 47. Professional status may also cause problems because
group norms define individual behavior. "Working in groups is notoriously difficult. Problems
of authority, dependency, intimacy and security, among others, are acute for group members.
Group myths and unstated assumptions may govern conduct, making more difficult the
accomplishment of work." Greenebaum, Attorneys' Problems in Making Ethical Decisions,
52 IND. L.J. 627, 632 (1977).
See M. ARGYLE, SOCIAL INTERACTION 368 (1969).
Thomas Shaffer has noted that "[tihe role concept is sociological-seen from the out-
side in; the identity concept is psychological-seen from the inside out." Shaffer, Christian
Theories of Professional Responsibility, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 721, 731 (1975). He offers a simple
means of visualizing role and identity: "If I close my eyes and imagine a lawyer, I expose
myself to a role. If I close my eyes and see me, I expose myself to an identity." Id.
' See Bresnahan, Theology and Law: A Deeper Understanding of Vocation, 7 CAP. U.L.
Rav. 25, 27 (1977).
" Shaffer, supra note 56, at 735.
s, See Watson, supra note 51, at 94-95. See generally J. FRANK, supra note 26, at 57-92.
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a vocation because it gives them an opportunity to "operate from a
position of power and authority, as they organize, conceptualize,
and manipulate the social forces known as law."6 Watson has also
observed in lawyers "the wish to create orderliness in ideas, institu-
tions, and relationships."' He cautions that "perhaps some of this
need for order... may occasionally cause problems through forcing
premature decisions about clients, their needs, and their wishes." 2
Personal identity and professional role interact in other ways. For
example, many lawyers enter the profession with the hopes of ren-
dering service to clients and of furthering social justice.63 These
goals come into direct conflict with the need to derive personal
income and attain financial success from the provision of client
service.64 The economic conflict of interest between a lawyer and his
client raises a serious question concerning the ability of a lawyer to
represent the best interests of the client. "Simply put, a quick set-
tlement is often in the lawyer's financial interest, while waiting the
insurer out is often in the client's financial interest."'" In addition,
an economic status tied to client fees preserves a conservative orien-
tation in the profession because many lawyers are unwilling to jeop-
ardize their financial security. "This unwillingness tones down the
would-be radical, 'liberalizes' him and links him with conservatives
in working in the system."66
Watson, The Lawyer as Counselor, 5 J. FAM. L. 7, 9 (1965). See also S. SCHEINGOLD, supra
note 22, at 158-59; McDougal, Beware the Squid Function, 1 LEARNING & L., Spring 1974,
16, at 18.
I Watson, supra note 60, at 10. See also S. SCHEINGOLD, supra note 22, at 159.
42 Watson, supra note 60, at 10.
3 See generally T. SHAFFER, THE PLANNING AND DRAFTING OF WILS AND TRUSTS 10-14 (1972).
The lawyer's desire to help others raises questions about self-esteem. For example, can a
person without the basic security derived from self-esteem "help" others? How does the level
of self-esteem affect the lawyer's identification with others, for example, with judges, impor-
tant clients, opposing counsel?
. This conflict has certain psychological dimensions. See A. WATSON, supra note 53, at 18.
In the world of adult reality, success, economic security, and a sense of individual
worth and well-being, relate to the capacity for accomplishing productive, creative,
and valuable work for others.... A confused sense of guilt causes some professional
people to feel that it is vaguely immoral to make money. Parsons describes this phe-
nomenon and its sociological implications and points out that there is a common feel-
ing among professionals that, when a person performs a task which is socially valu-
able, he should not be rewarded as greatly as if he were a "businessman."
Id. at 18-19. Cf. Shaffer, supra note 56, at 734 (discussing the conflict between a lawyer's
professional and personal lives).
" See D. RoSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? 96 (1974) (study of personal
injury lawyers indicating that the economics of prolonged litigation may prompt the lawyer
to settle quickly, contrary to the client's financial interests).
U Bonsignore, supra note 31, at 140.
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Underlying the conflict between the private and professional lives
lies a more fundamental tension between professional work and pri-
vate life." This tension or conflict can be visualized as intersecting
circles; the area of intersection represents a merger of the lawyer's
professional and private lives. The traditional model of professional-
ism depicts the lawyer's public and personal lives as largely mu-
tually exclusive.8 This model is consistent with the attributes of the
professional mask: the lawyer must be detached, objective, unemo-
tional, and in control of the client. Here the legal persona is a kind
of facade for the public, a mask for the private self of feelings.
The legal persona, however, can touch the private life of the self
profoundly. Commonly, the legal persona dominates the individ-
ual's personality." Such a lawyer eats, breathes, and sleeps law. He
"talks like a lawyer," "thinks like a lawyer," and for good measure
dresses like a lawyer. In such a case of psychological identification,
the legal persona is internalized and "becomes indistinguishable at
a psychological level from other disguises of the self." 0 The effects
of overidentification with the lawyer's role lead to rigidity and an
inability to change masks as required by society. Ultimately, over-
identification with the professional mask may cause psychological
problems." Because the lawyer's role is invested with so much sta-
tus and prestige and because the mask fits so well, the danger of
overidentification with the legal persona may not be apparent to the
individual .72
4 See generally F. MARKS, THE LAWYER, THE PUBLIC, AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 241-
42 (1972); Reisman, supra note 4, at 666.
" "Many people lead dual lives, one which is dominated by the persona, and one which
satisfies other psychic needs." C. HALL & V. NORDBY, A PRIMER OF JUNGIAN PSYCHOLOGY 45
(1973).
While manifestly participating in one system of roles, the individual will have some
capacity to hold in abeyance his involvement in other patterns, thus sustaining one or
more dormant roles that are enacted roles on other occasions. This capacity supports
a life cycle, a calendar cycle, and a daily cycle of role enactments; such scheduling
implies some jurisdictional agreements as to where and what the individual is to be
when. This role-segregation may be facilitated by audience-segregation, so that those
who figure in one of the individual's major role-sets do not figure in another, thereby
allowing the individual to possess contradictory qualities.
E. GOFFMAN, supra note 5, at 90-91.
' See generally id. at 89-90.
j. NOONAN, supra note 40, at 22.
'I "At the extreme, the ... splitting off of logic, common sense, and rationality from the
deeper layers of the personality produce the compulsive-obsessive person, the compulsively
rational person, the one who can't live in the world of emotion at all .... A. MASLOW, THE
FARTHER REACHES OF HUMAN NATURE 87 (1961).
" Neurotic overidentification should not be confused with a healthy integration of profes-
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Yet another possible relation between roles and self exists: the
diverse professional roles of the lawyer and the conflicts of profes-
sional and private lives create an environment of constant
change-from role to role, from professional to private to profes-
sional life. Lawyers reasonably might be compared to the "shape-
shifting" figure of Greek mythology-Proteus. Psychiatrist Robert
Lifton has used the concept of "Protean man" as the metaphor for
"an emerging psychological style.""3 This Protean style is
"characterized by an interminable series of experiments and explo-
rations, some shallow, some profound, each of which can readily be
abandoned in favor of still new, psychological quests." 4 In essence,
the Protean style is the wearing of many masks and the experiencing
of the psychological consequences.7 5
Erik Erikson has assessed these problems of overidentification
with roles and self-identity within role-playing inherent in the
Protean style:
But what if role-playing becomes an aim in itself, is rewarded with
success and status, and seduces the person to repress what core-
identity is potential in him? Even an actor is convincing in many
roles only if and when there is in him an actor's core-identity-and
craftsmanship. Comparably, there may well be some character
types who thrive on Protean possibilities .... [A] Protean person-
ality today may, in fact, be an attempt... to adjust to overwhelm-
ing change by a stance of deliberate changeability, of maintaining
the initiative by playing at change so as to stay ahead of the game. 6
The concept of Protean man aids in understanding a profession
in which roles are so diverse. The lawyer is counselor, advisor,
friend, negotiator, advocate, writer, and problem solver. The para-
dox for the lawyer lies in the quest for an identity in the midst of
constant change. Even in the original Protean personality, however,
sional roles and private self. Some people may be "self-actualizing" individuals who
"assimilate their work into the identity, into the self, i.e., work actually becomes part of the
self, part of the individual's definition of himself." A. MASLOW, EupsYcmms MANAGEMEN: A
JOURNAL 1 (1965).
The integration of professional and private lives may also create ethical dilemmas. "Coping
with the resulting internal conflicts is a part of every attorney's personal agenda." Greene-
baum, supra note 54, at 630. See generally Watson, Lawyers and Professionalism: A Further
Psychiatric Perspective on Legal Education, 8 U. Micm. J.L. REF. 248 (1975).
, R. LIPrON, BOUNDARIES 37 (1969).
" Id. at 44.
See id. at 45.
" E. EmKSON, DIMENSIONS OF A NEW IDENTrrY 106-07 (1974).
[Vol. 64:735
1978] The Legal Persona
there was a "core-identity in the multiplicity of elusive roles. ' 77 For
the lawyer, legalism as a world view provides the overarching frame-
work within which he dons and discards new roles and within which
the various contradictory tensions in and among the roles con-
verge."' The challenge for the lawyer is to resolve not only these
tensions but the tensions that arise between his professional roles
and his private life. From his "shape-shifting" posture, the lawyer
must take care to retain certain values that mark him as a sensitive,
thinking being. Otherwise,
The neglect or ignoring of certain human values in legal education
and the lawyering process make[s] being a lawyer less than the full
and rich human experience it can be for the practicing professional.
The difference may be between lawyering as a narrow and unfulfill-
ing professional role and lawyering as a place for the expression of
one's own humanness. 79
B. The Persona and the Client
To understand the nature of the lawyer's professional role, his
interpersonal relationships must be considered. Even the sociologist
will concede that a "role cannot exist without one or more relevant
other-roles toward which it is oriented"; 0 the lawyer cannot scruti-
nize himself or be scrutinized in a social vacuum.' Moreover, as
1 Id. at 106.
Is Interestingly, Erik Erikson describes Thomas Jefferson as a Protean man and suggests
that Jefferson's various contradictory characters and roles ("farmer and architect, rebel and
aristocrat, statesman and philospher, American and classicist") were held together by a
certain "steadfastness of character." Id. Although Robert Lifton, using the concept of Protean
man as a psychological tool, suggests that no "set of beliefs ... can command his [Protean
man's] allegiance for more than a brief experimental interlude," he admits that "much
within him must remain constant in order to make possible his psychological flux." R. LniroN,
supra note 73, at 54, 62.
71 J. Himmelstein, Reassessing the Lawyering Process-Proposal for a Project on the Appli-
cation of Humanistic Educational Psychology to the Teaching of Law 1-20 (Dec. 1976) (un-
published ms.) (copy on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
9, Turner, Role-Taking: Process versus Conformity, in HUMm BEHAVIOR & SOCIAL
PRocEssEs 20, 23 (A. Rose ed. 1962).
" Theodore Reik states that "[s]elf-observation . . . originates in the awareness of being
observed. The intermediary stage between the observation of others and self-observation is
thus the realization that one is observed by others." T. Rxu, THE SEARCH WrrHIN 250 (1956).
See also K. HoRNEY, NEURosis AN HuMAN GROWTH 291-308 (1950). The concept of viewing
others viewing self as stated here has been referred to as the "recycling dyadic process." In
this process:
The perceiver, in some sense aware of many of the general properties of the other
person (consciousness, mind) or of his specific attributes (for example, generosity) has
to allow for the fact that he himself, with similar properties, is also the object of
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Anselm Strauss has observed, "the interactional situation is not an
interaction between two persons, merely, but a series of transactions
carried on in thickly peopled and complexly imaged contests." 2 In
personal interactions, the participants "perceive the situation, ob-
serve what is required with respect to the status of each, and carry
out the requisite or selected line of action." 3
In the lawyer-client relationship, the elevated status accorded to
the lawyer as a professional tends to diminish awareness by the
parties of their individual role behaviors. As a result, attorney-client
interactions are based on a relationship of inequality, with the attor-
ney in the position of dominance. 4 Because the client has a problem
and needs advice, the client's dependency may be inevitable in the
beginning of the association. The lawyer is expected to intervene
and apply appropriate skills and knowledge to "solve" the problem.
In one sense, the client seeks to be "rescued" from his problem. 5
One sociologist has concluded, however, that lawyer dominance
is unfavorable to the client's best interest;81 clients who share deci-
sionmaking with the lawyer achieve more favorable outcomes. 7 In
addition to this disutility, lawyer dominance may have profound
psychological effects on both the client and the practitioner.8 The
person being helped projects certain feelings and attributes onto the
helper. This projection or transference may extend the client's su-
perficial dependence on the lawyer. 9 The tendency of clients to
become dependent or "hooked" on lawyers is related to the percep-
tion of the lawyer as an authority or parental figure. In addition
perception and thought and that, as such, he influences his own object of perception.
Observer and observed are simultaneously observed and observer [in] ... their recip-
rocal perceptions, in a continuous recycling but varying process during which each
person uses the variations in himself and the other person as a means of validating
his hypotheses about the other.
Tagiuri, Person Perception, in 3 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 395, 426 (2d ed. 1969).
" A. STRAuSS, MmRoRS AND MAsS 56-57 (1959).
Id. at 55.
U Wasserstrom, supra note 7, at 16.
See M. JAMEs & D. JONGEWARD, BORN TO WIN: TRANSACTIONAL ANALYSIS WITH GESTALT
EXPERIMENTS 85-89 (1971); Steiner, Rescue, in LovE, THERAPY, AND POLITICS 43-63 (H. Wyckoff
ed. 1976).
" D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 65, at 29-61.
v Id.
" See, e.g., A. WATSON, supra note 53, at 11-14; A. WATSON, supra note 23, at 23-25.
" See id.
" The client "must place himself under the authority and assistance of the lawyer, essen-
tially in blind trust. By virtue of this fact, all the client's previous attitudes about authority
and dependency will be stirred up." A. WATSON, supra note 53, at 17. See generally J. FL6GEL,
THE PSYCHO-ANALYTIC STUDY OF THE FAImY 119-20 (1926); H. LASSWELL, THE ANALYSIS OF
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to the transference of positive feelings that encourage dependency,
the client may project negative feelings onto the lawyer, causing the
client to be hostile and uncooperative."
Client hostility to individual lawyers is mirrored in society's
ambivalent attitudes toward lawyers. Jerome Frank found the
ambivalence "a mingling of respect and derision. '9 2 He argued that
"the cynical disdain of the lawyers" is derived from "a belief that
the lawyers complicate the law, and complicate it wantonly and
unnecessarily, [in] that, if the legal profession did not interpose its
craftiness and guile, the law could be clear, exact and certain.""3
Client and public ambivalence to lawyers in part may result from
the mask of the legal persona. Erik Erikson has described how a
facade (in this case, the legal persona) may arouse admiration "to
the point of canonization." Yet it also "provides disbelief and suspi-
cion, ranging all the way from the mild assertion that in some ways
the hero seems to be human (meaning like us) to the pleasure of
finding cracks in the great facade.""4
Client suspicion of lawyers can only be encouraged by the lawyer's
rigid maintenance of his professional role. By subsuming self to
mask, the lawyer alienates himself from the clients and from the
POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 186-87 (1948). To an extent, clients may prefer a dependency relationship
because they "harbor certain magical expectations, for instance, that the lawyer is able to
accomplish any manipulation or transaction which the client desires." A. WATSON, supra note
53, at 17-18.
2 The hostility toward lawyers may stem from uncertainty concerning proper client behav-
ior. On the one hand, the client's dependency on a lawyer complements the client's expecta-
tion that the lawyer will take command. But at the same time, the client may expect to be
treated as an equal. See D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 65, at 13-16, 43, 120-22, 151.
,2 J. FRANK, supra note 26, at 3. Members of society may respect the law and not the lawyer.
See Waltz, Some Thoughts on the Legal Profession's Public Image, 23 DE PAUL L. REy. 651,
652 (1974). Frank finds that lawyers are respected for their role in seeking justice, social
control, and the protection of life and property. "Inevitably the importance of such functions
invests the legal profession with dignity." J. FRANK, supra note 26, at 3.
0 Id. at 3, 5. See Shklar, In Defense of Legalism, 19 J. LEGAL EDUC. 51, 53-54 (1966). One
commentator views public suspicion, fear, and disapproval of lawyers as a function of their
having more power than the average citizen. Waltz, supra note 92, at 656. Another theory
explaining hostility to lawyers is "that the lawyer's words, thoughts, and convictions are,
apparently, for sale and at the service of the client. .. ." Wasserstrom, supra note 7, at 14.
Wasserstrom argues that it is this "verbal, role-differentiated behavior of the lawyer qua
advocate [that] puts the lawyer's integrity into question in a way that distinguishes the
lawyer from the other professionals." Id. (footnote omitted). Many other causes for public
condemnation of the legal profession could be catalogued. See Waltz, supra note 92. See also
Waltz, The Unpopularity of Lawyers in America, 25 Crzv. ST. L. REV. 143 (1976). For a
historical perspective, see Gawalt, Sources of Anti-Lawyer Sentiment in Massachusetts, 1740-
1840, 14 Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 283 (1970).
" E. ERIKSON, supra note 76, at 54.
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vital humanity of interaction. 5 This type of relationship especially
is characteristic of lawyers whose selves are split into professional
and private compartments. Lawyers attempt to protect themselves
from the deep feelings which follow psychological identification with
client concerns. Maintaining a facade of impersonal coolness pre-
cludes a confrontation of the real self of the lawyer with the client;
hence, the lawyer relates to the client in terms of functional status,
i.e., attorney to client.
In sum, the professional norms of objectivity and detachment
isolate the lawyer from his own feelings, even though one's emotions
form the core of one's being. Only through a relationship in which
attorney and client interact openly and on an equal basis can both
seek recognition, appreciation, respect, and value in the other as a
total being. 6
III.
The challenge for the individual lawyer is to realize the signifi-
cance of the professional mask and how it affects him as a person97
and as a professional helper. The analysis of the legal persona has
raised a number of questions: what kinds of impediments does the
mask create for the attorney's private life? What meaning do law-
yers give the lawyering mask and how does that meaning affect
their psychological well-being? Can a lawyer perform with the
mask and grow psychologically and interpersonally? Can lawyers
achieve harmony between their personal and professional lives?
Can legal education be used to teach the prospective lawyer about
the mask and its role? 8
"' John Noonan has recently used the term "mask" in a similar context. See J. NOONAN,
supra note 40. Noonan views the "mask" as "classifying individual human beings so that their
humanity is hidden and disavowed." Id. at 19. Noonan distinguishes his usage from that in
psychology, where the mask is referred to as a disguise for the inner self or psyche. Id. at 19-
20. "Mask is the metaphor I have chosen for [legal] constructs, because the human face is
where emotion and affection are visible if not deliberately concealed." Id. at 20. "[T]he
institution of the law is an official, artificial, and formal way of dealing with people and events
in the world." Eisele, supra note 14, at 380 (emphasis in original). Eisele further notes that
the law as an institution speaks "in one.dimensional ways about people and the world." Id.
at 385.
" See id. at 398, 400.
""When we analyse the persona we take off the mask .... " C. JUNG, Two ESSAYS ON
ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY 156 (1953).
," Judith Shklar expresses doubt as to the efficacy of attempts by academic lawyers to
"reorient the thinking of lawyers by altering legal education in America." J. SHKLAR, supra
note 18, at 18. Her skepticism is based on the fact that "[tihese proposals come mostly from
academic lawyers who, like their medical-school counterparts, have a rather different view
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Although these questions presently cannot be answered categori-
cally, a "humanistic" approach to lawyering and legal education is
one context in which these questions can be considered. A humanis-
tic approach involves "a lifelong search for understanding about
yourself and your world,""9 and, in this essay, emphasizes the per-
sonal aspects of lawyering and the potential for desirable change
that exists within the individual actor. An integral aspect of the
humanistic approach to law, the teaching of law, lawyers, and law-
yering is the need to achieve greater insight," which includes an
awareness of self °10 and an awareness of self in interaction with
others in society. 2 Through self-awareness and an understanding of
the legal persona the lawyer can begin to achieve the potential for
becoming a humanistic helper and thinker.11 3
of their profession than do their client-oriented former students." Id. A sociological study of
the socialization and professionalization of lawyers supports Shklar's conclusions. This study
concludes that law school is only the beginning of professional socialization, with the major
part of socialization following law school. Lortie, Laymen to Lawmen: Law School, Careers,
and Professional Socialization, 29 HAv. EDUc. Rav. 352, 369 (1959).
" R. KATz, PRELuDEs TO GROWTH, AN EXPERIENTIAL APPROACH 13 (1973). "It involves the
whole man, including his physical, emotional, and spiritual dimensions as well as his intellec-
tual dimensions. Humanistic education can evolve into education as personal growth or
education for personal growth." Id. at 13.
For a discussion of the humanistic perspective in legal education, see d'Errico, Arons, &
Rifkin, Humanistic Legal Studies at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, 28 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 18 (1976); Kershen, Humanization of Lawyers at Harvard, 61 A.B.A.J. 223 (1975);
Redmount, Humanistic Law through Legal Education, 1 CONN. L. Rv. 201 (1968); Redmount
& Shaffer, Learning the Law-Thoughts Toward a Human Perspective, 51 NOMa DAME LAw.
956, 962-69 (1976); Reich, Toward the Humanistic Study of Law, 74 YALE L.J. 1402 (1965);
Savoy, supra note 31. For a more critical and pessimistic view, see Botein, Reflections on the
New Humanism in Law, 22 WAYNE L. Rzv. 1295 (1976).
I" Harold Lasswell, one of our foremost interdisciplinary legal scholars, has stated that the
purpose of self-scrutiny is the clarification, formulation, adoption, and employment of
"procedures whose principal role is to prepare the thinker to endure or attain a higher level
of rationality." Lasswell, Clarifying Value Judgment: Principles of Content and Procedure,
1 INQUtRY 87, 96 (1958).
M, The term "self" is used by different writers and schools of psychology to refer to person-
ality, person, mind, ego, the life theme, "I," and subjective life in general. For a review of
the literature on the "self," see, for example, R. WYLIE, THE SELF CONCEPT (rev. ed. 1974).
See also Interview with M. Brewster Smith, Are You an Iceberg, a Mirror or an Island? Our
Many Versions of the Self, PsYcH. TODAY, Feb. 1976, at 74.
102 See Redmount, Attorney Personalities and Some Psychological Aspects of Legal
Consultation, 109 U. PA. L. Rav. 972, 974 (1961).
'" See A. WATTS, THE BOOK ON THE TABOO AGAINST KNOWING WHO You ARE (1967). The
call for greater awareness through self-exploration is not universally accepted. For example,
Lewis Thomas argues that the attempt to condition autonomic bodily functions "will con-
sume so much of our energy that we will end up even more cut off from things outside, missing
the main sources of the sensation of living." L. THomAS, THE LiVmS OF A CELL 68 (1974).
Zen Buddhism also seems to discount any concentrated focus on self. "Meditation (of the
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Self-scrutiny may take place at various levels. At its most superfi-
cial level, it is simply an intellectual effort to evaluate and gain
understanding of one's role within the legal system. For example, a
judge is required to engage in self-reflection to discover potential
bias and personal prejudices, which could affect the outcome of a
case.104 From a more theoretical level, a conscious effort of self-
observation underlies all legal obligations: the law of contracts re-
quires one to keep one's promises; and tort and property law ensure
that one will curtail activity that unreasonably endangers one's
neighbors and their possessions. Finally, at the highest level, self-
scrutiny is an attempt to gain awareness of one's particular world
view.
Self-awareness, however, cannot be achieved solely through an
understanding of the relation of self within society. Lawyers should
also engage in a cognitive process more closely related to the psycho-
dynamics of individual therapy: a process intended to increase self-
awareness through insight.' Insight, as used here,
turns inward, and occasionally gives us an inkling of the influence
which our central emotions and motivations have on the very choice
of and the final evaluation of what we are observing.... True insight
is the power or act of seeing into a situation and into myself at the
same time: for the two are, in fact, one power, one act.'5 '
The benefit to the lawyer from an insight into the attorney-client
relationship lies in the acquired ability to understand and minimize
concentrative form) is an exercise which employs repetition to turn off the active mode of
consciousness, and allows a 'bypass' to be developed into the quiescent, receptive mode."
Foreword (pt. 4) to THE NATURE OF HUMAN CONSCIOuSNESS 213, 214 (R. Omstein ed. 1973).
See also C. NARANJo & R. ORNsTEIN, ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MEDITATION (1971).
"I The effort to become fully conscious of one's personal biases may be more difficult than
the legal system admits. Jerome Frank argues:
Our most compelling biases have deeper roots and are far better concealed from con-
sciousness [than, for example, political biases]. They often grow out of childish aims
which are not relevant to our adult status. To admit their existence would be difficult
and painful. Most of us are unwilling-and for the most part unable-to concede to
what an extent we are controlled by such biases. We cherish the notion that we are
grown-up and rational, that we know why we think and act as we do, that our thoughts
and deeds have an objective reference, that our beliefs are not biases but are of the
other kind-the result of direct observation of objective data.
J. FRANK, supra note 26, at 29 (footnote omitted).
10 Karen Homey argues: "Observation and critical intelligence are no substitute for that
inner certainty with reference to others which is possessed by a person who is realistically
aware of himself as himself and others as themselves, and who is not swayed in his estimate
of them by all kinds of compulsive needs." K. HORNEY, supra note 81, at 295.
10 E. ERIKSON, LiFE HISTORY AND THE HISTORICAL MOMENT 173 (1975).
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the unconscious aspects of decisionmaking.10 One commentator has
ventured that:
[I]t is surely untoward-nay, unconscionable-for the law to be the
dupe of unconscious wishes, especially if these wishes reflect the
primitive, irrational, archaic, and mutually contradictory ideas and
impulses of early childhood. Rather, the law ought-to the greatest
extent possible-[to] be a product of sober, serious, informed, re-
flective adult thought. Hence the more lawyers know about uncon-
scious motivation, the more likely it is that they will be able to help
the law resist the influence of immature and irrational repressed
urges-and in so doing, help the law become as mature and effective
as possible." 8
In the psychotherapeutic or psychoanalytic sense, pursuing self-
awareness through insight, turns one's focus from self-observation
on a conscious level to unconscious intrapsychic phenomena.", Psy-
choanalytic theory offers not only a structure for understanding
internal mental processes; it also offers a technique and method of
obtaining insight into those intrapsychic forces which affect deci-
sionmaking.11 The psychoanalytic method requires a subject to re-
"I Freud demonstrated the influence of the unconscious on our actions. Our "life script"
is written at least in "rough draft" during the earliest years of childhood. From psycho-
analytic theory we derive understanding of the unconscious motivations which "push us into
actions and feelings and responses that may be different from what we consciously desire and
may even be destructive of satisfactory relations with the world around us." K. HORNEY, SELF-
ANSLYsis 37-38 (1942). Although Freud premised the existence of these unconscious forces on
his observations of psychologically disturbed patients, he argued that similar forces and
energies comprise the unconscious of healthy individuals as well. See S. FREUD, Psycho-
pathology of Everyday Life, in THE BAsrc WRITINGS OF SIGMUND FREUD 33 (1938).
Regardless of one's view of psychoanalysis as effective clinical treatment, the psychoanaly-
tic frame of reference is of obvious benefit in studying the "inner" private life that affects
the decisionmaking of professionals. One legal commentator has observed that
"[p]sychoanalysis is a form of education to open a man to himself and to his society, to widen
his area of choice and increase his responsibility as to each particular choice." Kaplan, An
Academic Lawyer Plays Armchair Analyst: Some Speculations on the Relevance of Psycho-
analysis to the Law, 46 NEB. L. REv. 759, 779-80 (1967).
3M Schoenfeld, Law and Unconscious Motivation, 8 How. L. REv. 15, 25-26 (1962).
', For a nontechnical description of the distinction between psychoanalysis and psycho-
therapy, see Waelder, The Scientific Approach to Case Work, in PERSONALrTY IN NATURE,
SocETY, AND CpLTuRE 671, 672-73 (2d ed. C. Kluckhohn & H. Murray eds. 1953).
" Freud initially conceptualized mental processes as occurring at conscious, preconscious,
and unconscious levels within the psyche. In this topographical view of the psyche, the
preconscious was a kind of staging area and censor for conscious awareness and consisted of
thoughts and memory traces that were available and subject to recall by the individual. Freud
viewed the preconscious as "latent but capable of becoming conscious" as opposed to "that
which is repressed and ... not, in itself and without more ado, capable of becoming con-
scious." S. FREUD, THE EGO AND THE ID 5 (rev. ed. 1960).
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late experiences, feelings, emotions, and fears to an analyst who
attempts to guide the patient in recognizing and understanding
unconscious motivations. " In this process of "working through" the
unconscious material, the client obtains the insight necessary to
reduce the effects of unconscious forces that underlie emotions and
that oftentimes produce undesirable behavior.112 In the psychoana-
lytical setting, the analyst and analysand share in the effort "to
arrive at an understanding of the reasons why the analysand ar-
ranges his life in the way he does."1 3
Individuals engaging in self-scrutiny and a study of the legal per-
sona outside the psychoanalytical setting obviously do not have the
advantage of "working through" unconscious conflicts and re-
pressed drives and thoughts with an analyst. The essential unre-
solved question is whether insight for effective self-scrutiny is possi-
ble without the encouragement and guidance of an experienced psy-
Thoughts and emotions blocked from conscious awareness and inaccessible to the individ-
ual were localized in the unconscious, maintained by the operation of a mental force Freud
called "repression." In Freud's view, this mental repression actively blocked thoughts, memo-
ries, and feelings from entering consciousness. Repression thereby prevented observation of
these phenomena by cognitive intellectual conscious effort. See id. at 4-5.
' Karen Homey asserts that the three primary tasks of the patient are first to:
express himself as completely and frankly as possible. The second is to become aware
of his unconscious driving forces and their influence on his life. And the third is to
develop the capacity to change those attitudes that are disturbing his relations with
himself and the world around him.
K. HORNEY, supra note 107, at 101.
112 See 1 F. DEUTSCH & W. MURPHY, THE CLINICAL INEaviEw 15 (1955).
Although many psychotherapists currently view Freudian psychoanalytic therapy with
disfavor, psychoanalytic theory offers the only thorough explanation of the relationship be-
tween man's behavior and his motives. F. CREws, OUT OF My SYsTEM 4 (1975). Crews argues
that "[w]hatever its therapeutic or even its conceptual disadvantages, only psychoanalysis
has registered the psychic costs involved in man's prolonged dependency and his improvising
of culture out of thwarted desire." Id. at 76. Freud must be given credit then, not for the
discovery of the unconscious but for creating a systematic theory which views both the
conscious and unconscious as operative in understanding behavior and the nature of man.
See generally S. FREUD, THE COMPLETE INTRODUcTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHOANALYSIS (1966).
For applications of psychoanalytic theory to law, see, for example, A. EHRENZWEIG,
PSYCHOANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1971); C. SCHOENFELD, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND LAw (1973);
Bienenfeld, Prolegomena to a Psychoanalysis of Law and Justice, (pt. 2) 53 CAUF. L. REV.
957, 1254 (1965); Desmonde, Psychoanalysis and Legal Origins, 34 INT'L J. PSYCHO-ANALYSIS
52 (1953); Ehrenzweig, Psychoanalytical Jurisprudence: A Common Language for Babylon,
65 COLUM. L. REv. 1331 (1965); Goldstein, Psychoanalysis and Jurisprudence, 77 YALE L.J.
1053 (1968); Schoenfeld, Law and Childhood Psychological Experience, 14 CLEV.-MAR. L.
REv. 139 (1965); Schoenfeld, On the Relationship Between Law and Unconscious Symbolism,
26 LA. L. REv. 56 (1965); Schoenfeld, supra note 26; Szasz, Psychoanalysis and the Rule of
Law, 55 PSYCHOANALYTIC REv. 248 (1968).
"I Schafer, Action: Its Place in Psychoanalytic Interpretation and Theory, in I THE ANNUAL
OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 159, 187 (1973).
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choanalyst or psychotherapist.'1 4 Many serious obstacles exist to a
program of self-scrutiny and the use of insight to examine value
choices.115 Insight is "held in check by custom, social training, and
diverse fears"" 6 as well as a lack of time and motivation to engage
in sustained self-reflection. The lack of motivation to initiate a pro-
gram of self-scrutiny in part may result from a psychological unwill-
ingness to change established beliefs. For the lawyer, a process of
self-scrutiny that questions the underlying assumption that laws are
a product of rational decisionmaking can disrupt his view of an
orderly world, and the tendency to reject such analysis to preserve
a feeling of well-being is strong. In addition, resistance to uncon-
scious materials seriously cripples insight and understanding." 7 In
psychoanalytic theory, the first stage of resistance begins with the
rebellion against full compliance with the technique of free associa-
tion,' 8 where the patient attempts to reserve "some region or other
for himself so as to prevent the treatment from having access to
it.""' Finally, "repressive forces also keep material in the uncon-
scious from rising to the conscious level. The ability to control[,]
affect and detach oneself from the emotion that automatically sets
"I Karen Homey premises the "theoretical" possibility of self-scrutiny on clinical observa-
tions of patients who have been exposed to psychoanalysis in the treatment situation and who
have continued either between treatments or following a period of treatment to achieve
acceptable insight through self-analysis. She does not resolve the question of whether pre-
vious exposure to psychoanalysis is a precondition to self-analysis. K. Honm, supra note 107,
at 27-28. See K. HoRNEY, ARE You CONSIDERING PSYCHOANALYSIS? 240 (1946).
"' To suggest that true insight into one's motivations or an honest recognition of self is an
easy matter "is an illusion, a belief built on wishful thinking, and a positively harmful illusion
at that." K. HORNEY, supra note 107, at 18. From the outset, one must recognize that "self-
analysis is a strenuous, slow process, bound to be painful and upsetting at times and requiring
all available constructive energies." Id. at 18-19.
Rudolph Amheim, author of a brilliant work on art and perception, warns:
Reckless analysis of the self will do harm, but so will the artificial primitivism of the
man who refuses to know how and why he works. Modem man can, and therefore must,
live with unprecedented self-awareness. Perhaps the task of living has become more
difficult-but there is no way around it.
Foreword to R. ARNHEIM, ART AND VISUAL PERCEPTION at vii (1954).
M, J. LuFr, OF HuMAN INTERAMCON 14 (1969). See J. DoLLAn & N. MULER, PRSONALITY
AND PSYCHOTHERAPY 431-32 (1950). "There is nothing of which every man is so afraid as getting
to know how enormously much he is capable of." 1 S. KIEREAA ID, JouRNAs AND PAPERs
440 (1967). See G. MORGAN, THE HUMAN PREDICAMENT-DISSOLUTION AND WHOLENESS 16
(1968).
", See S. FREUD, supra note 112, at 286-302.
, Id. at 286-88. Resistance is not limited to the obstacles thrown in the paths of those who
attempt to pry into the private recesses of our minds. It also serves as a censor to avoid
conscious awareness of early childhood experiences, which have been lodged in the uncon-
scious.
"' Id. at 288.
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in when values are touched on is not easy to develop, and is therefore
rare."
120
Although a program of self-scrutiny may prove difficult, the need
to understand the legal persona more fully outweighs whatever ob-
stacles may be encountered. Unstable social relationships may com-
pel the lawyer to obtain a greater awareness of the mask. Too often
the attorney overly identifies with the legal persona and is unable
to take off the mask in his private life. 12' Spouses and friends may
find themselves-being "cross-examined" or asked to solve a problem
"legalistically" and therefore may resent the lawyer's total identifi-
cation with the persona.
The need to obtain greater awareness of the legal persona also
may arise from a concern that the mask is blocking the emergence
of other aspects of the personality or is restricting too narrowly the
way in which one is able to view the world. Students, for example,
often express concern that legal education interferes with their per-
sonal lives in ways other than the immediate commitment of time
and financial resources. 122 The basic motivation may be to simply
reclaim emotions and feelings once rejected as unlawyerlike.
Through self-scrutiny and greater awareness the lawyer can see and
resolve the contradictions in behavior and ideals, and can thus
achieve a "harmonious matching of [his] observable behavior and
his internal life of feelings, values and goals.' 1 23
Discovery of the professional mask can also affect relationships
with clients. Through self-study, the lawyer achieves a greater
awareness of unconscious behavioral traits that affect interactions
" A. MrrSCHERLICH, SocIE Y WITHOUT TH FATHER 29-30 (1963). Both Freud's and Jung's
works also suggest that insight into the unconscious can be an unsettling experience. Jung,
for example, describes part of the personality as a "shadow," a darker, negative, and poten-
tially evil side which is repressed. The "shadow" is a part of the unconscious and "consists
of all those uncivilized desires and emotions that are incompatible with social standards and
... all that we are ashamed of." J. SINGER, BOUNDARIES OF THE SoUL 192 (1972). See generally
E. ERIKSON, supra note 106, at 20-21; C. JUNG, THE UNDIscovERED SELF 60-61 (1958); E.
NEUMANN, THE ORIGINS AND HISTORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 351 (1970); I. PROGOFF, JUNG'S PSY-
CHOLOGY AND ITS SOCLI MEANING 107-08 (1955). Karen Homey finds, however, that "patients
are well able to protect themselves from insights they are not yet able to receive," assuaging
the concern that physical or psychological harms may result from self-analysis. K. HoRNEY,
supra note 107, at 33.
"I For one account of the disastrous effort of total identification, see C. REICH, THE
SORCERER OF BOLINAS REEF (1976).
In See, e.g., J. OSBORN, THE PAPER CHASE (1971); S. TUROW, ONE L (1977). See generally
Savoy, supra note 31.
I" W. DYER, THE SENsrrv MANIPULATOR 2 (1972). See also C. ROGERS, ON BECOMING A
PERSON 308 (1961).
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with clients. As the attorney begins to assess and perhaps challenge
accepted precepts of the legal persona, he will be able to view and
respond to client problems from a fresh perspective. This process of
assessment requires the lawyer to maintain a balance between his
legal persona and his nonlegal perceptions. The lawyer, stepping
away from the legal mask, gains new insight into the legal relation-
ships that surround him. Yet he must also be careful that his new
perception does not overwhelm his professionalism; the new reality
must refresh, not supplant. In a sense, the lawyer must be able to
draw upon nonlegal sources that sharpen his perception of his
clients' problems without sacrificing the expertise on which clients
depend.
Finally, one's ethical behavior and professional responsibility ar-
guably require an awareness of self, roles, profession, and society.
One commentator has theorized that self-knowledge is the very
basis for ethical being:"4 "Typically, the immoralist is one who lacks
self-understanding, who flees from himself, who obscures his re-
sponsibility for his actions, who is impulsive and irrational .... ,,
In contrast, self-understanding can help the individual accept re-
sponsibility for his actions and thus in turn sharpen his ability to
choose between the ethical and the unethical."2 At the very least
then, the process of seeking a deeper sense of self is "a movement
toward the ethical possibility."1
IV.
Although laws and the legal profession are extraordinarily influ-
ential in society, 121 we know very little about what it means to be a
lawyer. How does a lawyer perceive his role; how does the lay public
imagine it? What are the ways in which lawyers and judges tradi-
tionally conceive of and talk about their experiences, and how can
these modes of thought and expression be mastered-and perhaps
"I Stack, Kierkegaard. The Self and Ethical Existence, 83 ETmnCs 108 (1972-1973).
22 Id. at 109.
"s See id. at 109-12.
"' Id.
' "Modern man's life is controlled more effectively, forcefully, and in greater detail by law
than by any other agency of social control." Stumpf, The Moral Order and the Legal Order,
in TIE CONCEPT OF ORDER 385 (P. Kuntz ed. 1968). During the period between 1937 and 1968,
the mean percentage of lawyer-legislators in the United States House of Representatives was
57%. The Senate had an even higher mean percentage: 66%, with a peak of 74% in one year.
Green, Schmidhauser, Berg, & Brady, Lawyers in Congress: A New Look at Some Old
Assumptions, 26 W. POL. Q. 440, 440 (1973). See also Szanton, Public Policy and the Law:
Legal Training as 'Perverse' Preparation for Policymaking Role in Government, ANTrrRUST
L. & ECON. REV., No. 3, 1973, at 51.
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modified-by individual minds?"2 ' Can the individual lawyer give
meaning to his professional work, or will that meaning inexorably
be imposed from the outside?
Questions of this nature are seldom posed. This essay has at-
tempted to survey the social sciences for thinking that directs atten-
tion to the lawyer's world view and professional mask through
which the lawyer relates to society, clients, and self. The attempt
is necessarily a preliminary, tentative one, sketching avenues of
inquiry and posing more questions. Answers, if they exist, will
come from each individual's lifetime of experience with the law
and a deeper understanding of self gained through an awareness
of the legal persona.
12 We carry Heaven and Hell within us; we are the cosmogonic builders. We. have
choice-and all creation is our range.
For some it [is] a terrifying prospect. It would be better, think they, if Heaven were
above and Hell below-anywhere outside, but not within. But that comfort has been
knocked from us. There are no places to go to, either for reward or punishment. The
place is always here and now, in your own person and according to your own fancy.
The world is exactly what you picture it to be, always, every instant. It is impossible
to shift the scenery about and pretend that you will enjoy another, a different act. The
setting is permanent, changing with the mind and heart, not according to the dictates
of an invisible stage director. You are the author, director and actor all in one: the
drama is always going to be your own life, not someone else's. A beautiful, terrible,
ineluctable drama, like a suit made of your own skin. Would'you want it otherwise?
Could you invent a better drama?
H. MiLLER, SEXUS 428-29 (1965).
